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Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) 
Youngberg v. Romeo is a landmark u.s. Supreme Court deci· 
sion. The unanimous ruling. issued in 1982, affirmed certain 
substantive liberty rights of people with intellectual disabili-
ties (see COGNITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY). 
The named plaintiff was Nicholas Romeo, a person with 
profound MENTAL RETARDATION who lived at home with 
his parents until the age of 26. Following his father's death 
in 1974, Nicholas Romeo's mother determined that she was 
unable to care for Nicholas on her own. After court proceed-
ings, Nicholas Romeo was involuntarily and permanently 
committed to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a 
Pennsylvania state facility. Over the next two and a quarter 
years, Romeo was injured some 63 times by his own actions 
and those of fellow Pennhurst residents. 
Mrs. Romeo filed a federal lawsuit on her son's behalf, 
claiming that Pennhurst administrators knew or should have 
known about the harms Romeo suffered, yet had failed to 
take appropriate measures to prevent their occurrence. This 
neglect, it was alleged, violated his constitutional rights, spe-
Cifically the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process guarantee. The complaint requested both monetary 
damages and injunctive relief. 
Nicholas Romeo subsequently broke his arm and 
was transferred to the Pennhurst hospital ward, where he 
remained under physical restraints for parts of each day. 
However, the request for individual injunctive relief in 
Romeo's lawsuit was withdrawn because he was also a mem-
ber of a class-action case in what would become another 
Significant Supreme Court decision, Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v. Halderman. At trial, the jury issued a verdict 
in favor of defendant Pennhurst. Sitting en bane (meaning, 
in its entirety), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the jury verdict and remanded the case for a new 
trial. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (a writ from 
a higher court to a lower court) to review the decision. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee protected the rights of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities involuntarily com-
mitted to state institutions to reasonably safe conditions of 
confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, 
and minimally adequate habilitation training at those facili-
ties. The justices cautioned, however, that these liberty 
interests were "not absolute" and that "the demands of an 
organized society" could justify circumstances where a state 
institution involuntarily restrained an individual. In making 
such a determination "courts must show deference to the 
judgment exercised by a qualified professional" whose deci-
sion, the Court stated, "is presumptively valid." 
Youngberg v. Romeo is notable as the first occasion in 
which the Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the consti-
tutional due process liberty rights of involuntarily committed 
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities 
(see DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY). At the same time, com-
mentators havecriticized the ruling for adhering to the MED-
ICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY by creating a rule of deference 
to "qualified professionals;' rather than to individuals with 
disabilities and their advocates, for future courts determining 
the validity of involuntary restraint practices. 
Youngberg v. Romeo also is significant for arising at the 
forefront of ACTIVISM on behalf of institutionalized individ-
uals with intellectual disabilities. Drawing lessons from the 
successful INDEPENDENT LIVING MOVEMENT, which mainly 
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empowered people with phYSical disabilities, individuals with 
intellectual disabilities began to represent and achieve their 
own interests. People First was an especially prominent group 
in these more autonomous efforts, a good deal of which was 
directed toward people leaving state facilities and living inde-
pendently in the community. Later Supreme Court decisions 
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) and 
in Olmstead v. L.G. (1999), affirming the right of people with 
intellectual disabilities to live in their COMMUNITIES, and to 
do so in the least restrictive environment, can be attributed to 
the path breaking ruling of You/'lgberg v. Romeo. 
See also ASYLUMS AND INSTITUTIONS; INSTITUTIONAL-
IZATION; LAW AND POLICY. 
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Youngberg v_ Romeo (1982) 
Nicholas Romeo was a man with mental retardation (the term 
previously used to describe intellectual or cognitive disabilities) 
who was involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania state hospital. 
During his stay at the facility, he was repeatedly restrained and 
injured. In 1978 he sued Duane Youngberg, the superintendent of 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, claiming that the injuries he 
sustained from unsafe conditions, bodily restraints, and lack of life 
skills training violated his constitutional rights. The 1982 Supreme 
Court case of Youngberg v. Romeo emanating from his plight 
focused on whether institutionalized people like Romeo had con-
stitutional protection for their safety and care and protection from 
unreasonable bodily restraints. As the selections from this case out-
line, the judges ultimately ruled in favor of Romeo in a unanimous 
decision. This case remains a landmark in disability rights. 
Youngberg v. Romeo 
457 U.S. 307 
Justice [Lewis 1 Powell delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, 
involuntarily committed to a state institution 
for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confine-
ment; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) 
training or "habilitation." Respondent sued under 
42 U.s.c. § 1983 three administrators of the insti-
tution, claiming damages for the alleged breach 
of his constitutional rights. 
· .. We consider here for the first time the 
substantive rights of involuntarily committed 
mentally retarded persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. In this case, 
respondent has been committed under the laws of 
Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the com-
mitment. Rather, he argues that he has a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom 
of movement, and training within the institution; 
and that petitioners infringed these rights by fail-
ing to provide constitutionally required conditions 
of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been commit-
ted under proper procedures does not deprive 
him of all substantive liberty interests under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 
445 U.S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, the State 
concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. We must 
decide whether liberty interests also exist in safety, 
freedom of movement, and training. If such inter-
ests do exist, we must further decide whether they 
have been infringed in this case. 
· .. We have established that Romeo retains 
liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily 
restraint. 
· .. Persons who have been involuntarily com-
mitted are entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement than criminals 
whose conditions of confinement are designed to 
punish. 
· .. Moreover, we agree that respondent is enti-
tled to minimally adequate training. In this case, 
the minimally adequate training required by the 
Constitution is such training as may be reason-
able in light of respondent's liberty interests in 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. 
In determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in 
any case presenting a claim for training by a State-
we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 
. .. In deciding this case, we have weighed 
those post-commitment interests cognizable as 
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate 
state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. 
We repeat that the State concedes a duty to pro-
vide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medi-
cal care. These are the essentials of the care that 
the State must provide. The State also has the 
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety 
for all residents and personnel within the insti-
tution. And it may not restrain residents except 
when and to the extent professional judgment 
deems this necessary to assure such safety or to 
provide needed training. In this case, therefore, 
the State is under a duty to provide respondent 
with such training as an appropriate professional 
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety 
and to facilitate his ability to function free from 
bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could signifi-
cantly reduce the need for restraints or the likeli-
hood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally pro-
tected interests in conditions of reasonable care 
and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement 
conditions, and such training as may be required 
by these interests. Such conditions of confine-
ment would comport fully with the purpose of 
respondent's commitment. 
Source: Youngberg v. Romeo. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
